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Otter's Notes
  • Introduction
  • Articles
    • Dumping data from the Microsoft Recall folder
    • Gaining persistence on Windows with Time Providers
    • Reverse engineering LSASS to decrypt DPAPI keys
    • Intro to Hypervisor Implants
    • In-depth Windows Telemetry
  • Notes
    • Active Directory
      • Active Directory Structure
      • Active Directory Terminology
      • Active Directory Objects
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      • Security in Active Directory
      • Users and Machine Accounts
      • NTLM
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      • Making a Target User List
      • Enumerating & Retrieving Password Policies
      • Enumerating Security Controls
      • Examining Group Policy
      • GPOs
      • LAPS
      • LLMNR & NBT-NS Poisoning
      • LOLBIN Enumeration
    • AAD
      • Useful Links
      • Overview of Azure & M365
      • Enumerate Users and Domains
      • Post-exploitation Reconnaissance
      • OAuth 2.0 Abuse
      • Abusing Device Code Authentication
      • Abusing Cloud Administrator Role
      • Abusing User Administrator Role
      • AAD Federated Backdoor
      • Service Principal Abuse
      • Compromising Azure Blobs and Storage Accounts
      • Malicious Device Join
      • Disabling Auditing (Unified Audit Logs)
      • Spoofing Azure Sign-In Logs
      • Registering Fake Agents for Log Spoofing
      • Pass the PRT
      • Pass the Cookie
      • Abusing Managed Identities
      • Virtual Machine Abuse
      • Attacking Key Vaults
    • Forest Trust Abuse
      • Parent-Child Trust Abuse
      • One-Way Inbound Trust Abuse
      • Foreign Group Membership
      • Foreign ACL Principals
      • SID History
      • SID Filter Bypass
      • Intra-Forest Attacks
        • Configuration Naming Context Replication
        • ADCS NC Replication Attack
        • GPO On-Site Attack
        • GoldenGMSA Attack
        • DNS Trust Attack
      • Cross-Forest Attacks
        • Trust Account Attack
        • Abusing SQL Linked Servers
        • Abusing PAM Trusts
    • Kerberos
      • Overview of Kerberos Authentication
      • Silver Tickets
      • Golden Tickets
      • Diamond Tickets
      • Kerberoasting
      • AS-REPRoasting
      • Resource-Based Constrained Delegation
      • Constrained Delegation
      • Unconstrained Delegation
      • S4U2Self & S4U2Proxy
      • Golden Certificates
    • DACL Abuse
      • DACL Overview
      • DACLs Enumeration
      • AddMembers
      • GPO Attacks
      • Granting Rights and Ownership
      • Logon Scripts
      • NoPAC
      • Password Abuse
      • SPN Jacking
      • Shadow Credentials
      • Targeted Kerberoasting
    • ADCS
      • Introduction to ADCS
      • ESC1
      • ESC2
      • ESC3
      • ESC4
      • ESC5
      • ESC6
      • ESC7
      • ESC8
      • ESC9
      • ESC10
      • ESC11
      • Certificate Mapping
    • PowerShell
      • PowerShell Basics
      • PowerShell Remoting
      • Alternate PowerShell Hosts
      • PowerShell Pipeline Runners
      • PowerShell Code Signing
      • Scriptblock Logging
      • PowerShell CLM
      • AMSI
      • PowerShell Reflection
      • WMI - Windows Management Instrumentation
      • Interfacing with AD
      • PowerShell Snippets
        • Bypass application whitelisting and CLM with runscripthelper and WMI
        • Create fake PowerShell logs
        • Enumerate AD ACLs
        • Enumerate WMI events
        • Enumerate Domain Trusts
        • Enumerate change metadata
        • Enumerate non-signed service binaries
        • Enumerate with GPOs
        • Find signed alternate PowerShell hosts
        • Get AMSI module
        • Group processes by user with WMI
        • Hide processes from Get-Process
        • Malware re-purposing with PowerShell reflection
        • Monitor PowerShell hosts with WMI
        • PowerShell reflection offensive use-case
        • Query PowerShell alternative hosts with WMI
        • Retrieve file certificate
        • Search LDAP for misconfigurations
        • Sign custom code with PowerShell
        • WMI service creation
        • Weak folder permission enumeration
    • AWS
      • AWS Organizations
      • AWS Principals
    • Binary Exploitation
      • Environment setup for Browser Exploitation
      • Browser Overview and Components
    • Kernel Development
      • Windows
        • Configuring a VM for driver development
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  3. PowerShell Snippets

Get AMSI module

This code

  1. obtains the name and CLSID for AMSI via the registry

  2. obtains the name and CLSID for evert registered AMSI provider

  3. obtains the path and signer information for each DLL

  4. identifies if AMSI is loaded and/or initialized in the current process

function Get-AmsiModule {
<#
.SYNOPSIS

Retrieves information about AMSI and each registered AMSI provider.

.DESCRIPTION

Get-AmsiModule retrieves information about AMSI and registered AMSI providers. This is useful for defenders auditing the consistency of AMSI utilization across an environment.

Author: Matthew Graeber (@mattifestation)
License: BSD 3-Clause

.EXAMPLE

Get-AmsiModule

.OUTPUTS

AMSI.ModuleInfo

Outputs objects representing information about AMSI itself as well as each registered AMSI provider.

.NOTES

Get-AmsiModule only returns AMSI registrations that correspond to the architecture of the current PowerShell process. To return WOW64 registrations, run 32-bit PowerShell, if desired.
#>

    [CmdletBinding()]
    param()
    
    try {
        # requires PSv3+ due to use of Get-ItemPropertyValue
        Set-StrictMode -Version 3
    } catch {
		# throw a .NET exception instead of a PowerShell one
        throw $_
        return
    }

    $AmsiUtilsType = [PSObject].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')

    if ($AmsiUtilsType) {
        $IsInitialized = $AmsiUtilsType.GetField('AmsiInitialized').GetValue($null) > $null

        if (-not $IsInitialized) {
            Write-Verbose "AMSI is not initialized in the current process. Process ID: $PID"
        }
    } else {
        Write-Verbose 'The System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils class is not present.'
    }

    # get information for the base AMSI implementation
    # https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/
    $AMSIGuid = '{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}'

    $AMSIHKCRPath = "Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\$AMSIGuid"
    $AMSIName = Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path $AMSIHKCRPath -Name '(default)'
    $AMSIPath = Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path "$AMSIHKCRPath\InprocServer32\" -Name '(default)'

    $AMSIFileInfo = Get-Item -Path $AMSIPath.Trim('"')
    $AMSISignature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $AMSIFileInfo.FullName

    [PSCustomObject] @{
        PSTypeName = 'AMSI.ModuleInfo'
        CLSID = [Guid] $AMSIGuid
        Name = $AMSIName
        Module = $AMSIFileInfo
        Signature = $AMSISignature
    }

    # enumerate every registered AMSI provider
    Get-ChildItem -Path HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
        $ProviderGuid = $_.PSChildName
        $HKCRPath = "Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\$ProviderGuid"
        $ProviderName = Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path $HKCRPath -Name '(default)'
        $ProviderPath = Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path "$HKCRPath\InprocServer32\" -Name '(default)'
        $AMSIProviderModule = Get-Item -Path $ProviderPath.Trim('"')
        $ProviderSignature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $AMSIProviderModule.FullName

        [PSCustomObject] @{
            PSTypeName = 'AMSI.ModuleInfo'
            CLSID = [Guid] $ProviderGuid
            Name = $ProviderName
            Module = $AMSIProviderModule
            Signature = $ProviderSignature
        }
    }
}

References

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Last updated 8 months ago

AMSI